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Optimum currency area theory (OCA) is a body of work that was seen as highly influential by the
Eurozone’s creators. As Holly Snaith writes, it is often framed as providing a ‘checklist’ of ideal
policies against which – it is usually claimed – the Eurozone does not match up. She argues that
the theoretical contribution of OCA is considerably more complicated than this picture suggests.
She posits that, depending on which strand of OCA is favoured, entirely different narratives emerge
about what the Eurozone is, and how it should be governed.
Optimum Currency area theory is usually taken to originate with Robert Mundell in a 1961 paper
entitled ‘A theory of optimum currency areas’. Mundell’s central insight was to propose that the
territory of a currency need not match up to a nation state in order to be economically effective. The example he
provides is of the Americas. He invites us to imagine that rather than a Canadian and an American dollar, we instead
have ‘East Coast’ and ‘West Coast’ dollars, which better match up with the regionalised production capacities of the
two countries. Therefore, when demand for an East Coast product rises, the currency appreciates, rather than
stoking a boom in half the country that has to be balanced by depreciation in the other half.
The theory, in its original formulation, is an elegant and
simple depiction of a seemingly quite obvious problem: why
are currencies tied to economic territories they do not serve?
Might a different arrangement be better? It is not difficult to
see why this theory appealed to the creators of the Eurozone,
and indeed Mundell identified the then-EC as the most likely
place to test these ideas, stating that such a currency area
was feasible ‘only in areas where political organisation is in a
state of flux, such as . . . in Western Europe’. Mundell’s
influence was felt throughout the coming years, culminating
in the creation of the euro in 1999 and in the award of the
Nobel Prize for economics for him the same year. However,
the disarmingly simple problem did not remain simple for very
long, but rather raised a number of other, increasingly
complex, questions.
The first of these, quite obviously, was: what defines an
optimal currency area? In its simplest terms, it is an area in
which the benefits of forming a currency outweigh the costs.
But what kind of costs and benefits should we look for? And
how should we weight those costs and benefits? The original formulation of OCA took a single global currency to be
the starting point, which thus had no transaction costs (indeed, under the Bretton Woods arrangement, this was not
so conceptually far-fetched). Originating authors thus considered what the benefits were to slicing currencies up:
namely, better autonomy and responsiveness to local conditions. They further suggested that a number of factors
(‘criteria’) would help define what area would be optimal, such as labour and capital mobility, homogeneity, and
openness.
But all of these questions are as much political as they are economic, and even the authors operating within these
traditions gave very different answers over time. As McKinnon has observed in a 2004 paper, the Mundell of 1961
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seemed to envisage a small and homogenous currency area due to the costs of operating a single monetary policy.
By 1973 he was in favour of much larger currency unions due to their possible benefits of intensifying trade. Indeed,
this is the central paradox of OCA: if we take dynamic benefits to be part of the equation for determining whether a
region can be an OCA, then a sub-optimal union can become optimal over time, and the idea of optimality loses
much of its meaning.
This, of course, is the kind of paradox politicians can bank on, since it entails that the composition of a currency area
might not matter so much as the steps taken to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs. This is the gamble
that the creators of the Eurozone took: that by creating a single currency according to political, not economic,
boundaries, this convergence could be managed retrospectively. But a central plank of OCA theorists’ claims was
that an OCA could only minimise the costs of asymmetries – not make them disappear. The less optimal the
currency area, the greater the asymmetries – and the greater the number of economic ‘losers’ created by
adjustment. Later authors operating within the OCA tradition (such as Charles Wyplosz) observe the importance of
putting fiscal mechanisms in place to ensure that these losers would be compensated as part of a drive for
convergence. As the Eurozone crisis has shown, this criterion did not receive much political support.
The crucial point is that interpreting OCA in this way – as providing a ‘yes/no’ answer to what is, and is not, optimal,
but more importantly as a toolkit for managing politically acceptable sub-optimality – is perfectly in keeping with the
work of the economists within OCA. Both strands of this debate came to the fore during the 1992 process, where
France and Germany argued over how similar countries should be before they were allowed to join the euro. This
does not represent a manipulation of an economic debate, but rather a way of drawing on particular interpretations
of that debate, such that it justifies a whole array of political choices. And it is one that has clear resonance in the
case of the Eurozone, where politicians were clearly enamoured with the possibilities of creating a currency union,
but less so by the idea that the choice of participants might be out of their hands.
Regardless of which strand of OCA was taken from this à la carte menu, it is clear that the disagreements in OCA
theory come primarily from weighting costs versus benefits. And it is impossible to get away from the fact that there
are always costs. Having created a large, heterogeneous Eurozone in the hope that retrospective convergence
would allow countries to reap the benefits, policy-makers have been left with a currency union that not only
implements a (legitimately) selective interpretation of OCA theory, but one that leaves out certain crucial aspects of
that theory, such as fiscal compensation. So, is the Eurozone an OCA? On various quantitative criteria, probably not
(although it has been more and less so over time), but perhaps this is the wrong question to be asking. The more
important conclusion is that it could become more optimal, if the political mechanisms were put in place to facilitate
it.
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